



Safety Suggestion on FAs

해(海)결사 / Troubleshooter



INDEX

1. The concept of FAs
2. Current Status
3. Problems of FAs
4. Safety Suggestion on FAs
5. Conclusion



Are FAs vessels?

“While it may seem obvious, FAs are, first and foremost, vessels¹”

1) UNODC, Summary of Laws Floating Armories and Their Operations (Vienna: United Nations, 2020), p. 14.

How many FAs?

- United Nations estimates that 18 FAs are owned by 13 companies²
- EU NAVFOR estimates that it 20 FAs in Somalia are operating³
- FAs' operation area is concentrated in the Red Sea and Oman

Table 8.1 List of known floating armouries and associated vessels, 2014⁴

Ship name	IMO ship identification number	Flag state	Registered vessel type	Area
<i>Abdallah</i>	8112823	UAE	Supply tender	Gulf of Oman
<i>Alladin</i>	6524230	Djibouti	Research/survey vessel	Gulf of Oman
<i>Al Nader</i>	7027502	UAE	Supply ship	Gulf of Oman
<i>Anchor 1</i>	8965593	Cook Islands	Utility vessel	Red Sea
<i>Antarctic Dream</i>	5278432	Mongolia	Passenger ship	Gulf of Oman
<i>Arina Dilber</i>	8107713	Panama	Anchor handling vessel	Gulf of Oman
<i>Avant Garde</i>	n/a	New Zealand	Pleasure craft	Red Sea
<i>Avant Garde</i>	8107036	Sri Lanka	Supply ship	Red Sea
<i>Deena</i>	7313432	UAE	Supply ship	Gulf of Oman
<i>Defiant</i>	5427784	Panama	Pilot ship	Gulf of Oman
<i>Deo Juvante</i>	8701105	Cook Islands	Trawler	n/a
<i>Dynamic Karim</i>	8129084	Panama	Offshore supply ship	Gulf of Oman
<i>Elishka</i>	7406215	Liberia	Pipe carrier	Gulf of Oman
<i>Express Opportune</i>	9606194	Panama	Passenger	Persian Gulf
<i>Home</i>	8131386	Panama	Research vessel	Gulf of Oman
<i>LG251</i>	n/a	UK	n/a	Gulf of Oman
<i>Maagen</i>	n/a	Cook Islands	Pleasure craft	n/a

²) KIM, Jayoung, "A study on the Legal Issues and Challenges Related to Floating Armouries", *The Korean Journal of International Law*, Vol. 60, No. 4, 2015, p. 79.

³) *Ibid.*, p. 79.

⁴) Ioannis Chapsos & Paul Holtom, *Stockpiles at Sea: FLOATING ARMOURIES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN* (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2015), p. 223.

Why IMO?

- Shipping moves around 80% of world trade⁵
- The purpose IMO : to improve the safety of international shipping⁶
- IMO's Strategic Direction 2018 to 2023 : SD 5⁷

ASSEMBLY
30th session
Agenda item 7

A 30/Res.1110
8 December 2017
Original: ENGLISH

Resolution A.1110(30)

Adopted on 6 December 2017
(Agenda item 7)

STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE ORGANIZATION FOR THE SIX-YEAR PERIOD 2018 to 2023

SD 5: Enhance global facilitation and security of international trade

26 Shipping moves around 80%¹ of world trade, making it an integral part of the global economy and supply chain. The prevention of disruption to international shipping is therefore in the interest of all. Continued effort is needed to ensure that ships move from port to port without undue delay arising from arrival and departure formalities, to provide for safe transportation and effective facilitation of international trade, and to ensure that appropriate security measures are in place on all international voyages.

27 Threats such as piracy and armed robbery against ships could disrupt international trade, threaten lives, and increase the burden on maritime transport. Furthermore, to ensure the security of the maritime transport network, including vital shipping lanes, IMO will continue to raise awareness of IMO measures for security and to encourage a cooperative approach among Member States and stakeholders.

28 Shipping operations are increasingly dependent on electronics and digital technologies and as such are exposed to cyber risks. The Organization will continue to monitor the issue and encourage a cooperative approach among Member States and stakeholders.

29 Electronic transmission of relevant information, such as, but not limited to, documents and certificates, simplifies communications between ships, ports and authorities and reduces the administrative burden for those on board and ashore. The challenge is to ensure that information is transmitted securely in a universally accepted form and is verifiable. To take full advantage of the electronic exchange of information, closer cooperation is needed between authorities and the industry at the national and, in certain instances, regional levels.

⁵ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Review of Maritime Transport 2015(New York and Geneva, 2015).

⁶ IMO, "Introduction to IMO", <https://www.imo.org/en/About/Pages/Default.aspx>

⁷ International Maritime Organization (IMO), Resolution A.1110(30), STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE ORGANIZATION FOR THE SIX-YEAR PERIOD 2018 to 2023, 6 December 2017

Vessel classification

- No ship has been built for use as a FAs from design and construction stages⁸
- Operating companies usually modify or converts patrol ships and tugs into FAs⁹
- No suitable space exists for storing in-board weapons and ammunition¹⁰
- Standardized storage regulations do not exist¹¹
- The country that grants permission also flies Flag of Convenience.¹²
- FAs in operation are severely degraded from age, without active regulation that applies regarding their maintenance.

8) KIM, Jayoung, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

9) Alexis Wilpon, "Floating Armories: A Legal Grey Area in Arms Trade and the Law of the Sea", *Georgetown Journal of International Law*, Vol. 48, 2017, p. 888.

10) *Ibid.*, p. 882.

11) *Ibid.*, p. 882.

12) *Ibid.*, p. 889.

Ambiguous Vessel Classification

- IACS does not define Floating Armories.¹³
- FAs are former tugboats, fishing vessels, cargo ships and passenger ships, etc.¹⁴
- These vessels' IMO Numbers stay the same, even after modification to become FA.¹⁵

¹³) IACS, "Data exchange between Members of the International Association of Classification Societies & Equasis", p. 1-31.

¹⁴) SCEG UK, "ANNEX: Summary of Laws Regulating Floating Armouries and their Operation". p. 6.

¹⁵) PEW, "The IMO Number Explained", p. 1

CURRENT FLOATING ARMOURY OPERATORS

As of September 2018, there are four operators of FAs: MNG Maritime, Palm Charters, Sinbad Navigation and Ambrey Risk and their armoured vessels change on a fairly regular basis. The table below provides information about current FAs and related vessels including the owners/charterers (with country of company registration), state of vessel registration, accommodation capacity and additional relevant information:

Location	Vessel	Owner/Charterer	Registry	Accom	Remarks
Red Sea	MARKAB, IMO# 7605691, GT 871, Vessel Type: Cargo, Year Built: 1978	Transfer Vessel Services (UK)/Ambrey Risk (UK)	Djibouti	125 incl crew	Ex-Dutch pilot vessel
	MNG CAPT JAMES COOK, IMO# 7909853, GT 4232, Vessel Type: Special Purpose Vessel, Year Built: 1980	Trinity Offshore Pte, Singapore/MNG Maritime (UK)	St Kitts & Nevis	300	
	SEA LION, IMO# 7115567, GT 803, Vessel Type: Passenger, Year Built: 1971	Palm Charters Group (Spain)	Sierra Leone	87	FA facilities
	JUPITER, IMO# 7113002, GT 1594, Vessel Type Other, Year Built 1972	Palm Charters Group (Spain)	Mongolia	135	
	SULTAN, IMO# 763339, GT 1341, Vessel Type Unspecified, Year Built 1978	Palm Charters Group (Spain)	Mongolia	135	
	SINBAD, IMO# 7932006, GT 250, Vessel Type Other, Year Built 1981	Sinbad Navigation (UAE)	Mongolia		Former Swedish Coast Guard and Navy minesweeper and patrol vessel, HSwMS SKREDSVIK Accommodation vessel
	TRINITY LONDON, IMO# 7349443, GT 1321, Vessel Type Other, Year Built 1974	Trinity Offshore Pte Singapore/Sinbad Navigation (UAE)	Belize		Armoury vessel

Gulf of Oman	ALADIN, IMO# 6524230, GT 625, Vessel type other, Year Built 1965	Sinbad Navigation	Mongolia		Support vessel (logistics)
	OW267, MMSI# 457069000, GT 34, Vessel Type: Sailing Vessel for Support to PMSCs	Sinbad Navigation (UAE)	Mongolia		Shuttle vessel; Former Swedish Navy troop transporter and patrol vessel
	AM230, MMSI# 457070000, GT 34, Vessel type other	Sinbad Navigation (UAE)	Mongolia		Shuttle vessel
	MENKAR, IMO# 7605689, GT 871, Pilot Vessel, Year Built 1977	Transfer Vessel Services (UK)/Ambrey Risk (UK)	Djibouti	125 incl crew	Ex-Dutch pilot vessel
	WHITE PALM (ex-DEFIANT), IMO# 5427784, GT 760, Vessel Type Unspecified, Year Built 1963	Palm Charters Group (Spain)	Panama/Sierra Leone	120	FA Facilities
	BLUE PALM (ex-MNG DISCOVERY), IMO# 8027626, GT 815, Vessel type Tug, Year Built 1982	Arzphil LLC (UAE)/Palm Charters Group (Spain)	Mongolia		FA Facilities
	SEA AMBER (ex-MNG ENDEAVOUR), IMO# 7390430, GT 864, Vessel type Tug, Year built 1974	Palm Charters Group (Spain)	Panama		Accommodation vessel
	STERLING (ex-MNG RESOLUTION), IMO# 8413174, GT 393, Vessel type Tug, Year Built 1974	Palm Charters Group (Spain)	Mongolia		Shuttle vessel
	ANTARCTIC DREAM, IMO# 5278432, GT 2180, Vessel Type High Speed Craft, Year Built 1959	Sinbad Navigation (Spain)	Mongolia		Dutch-built former Chilean Navy vessel
	YASMEEN, MMSI# 457740000, Vessel Type: Sailing Vessel, Year Built: 1976	Sinbad Navigation (UAE)	Mongolia		Shuttle vessel; Former Swedish Navy troop transporter

MNG PEMBROKE, IMO# 8931190, GT 1000, Vessel Type: Special Purpose Vessel, Year Built: 1996	Excel International (UAE)/MNG Maritime (UK)	St Kitts & Nevis	250	Former Mauritius Coastguard vessel
MNG JORGIA, IMO# 341975000, GT 34, Vessel type Unspecified, Year built 1972	MNG Maritime (UK)	St Kitts and Nevis		Shuttle vessel

Floating Armouries Regulations 2019, Retrieved from :
<https://www.sceguk.org.uk/news-and-views/>

1 Cargo, 2 SPV, 1 Passenger, 8 Unspecified.

Low Traceability

- No information on actual number of FAs, number of weapons stored, or safety management.¹⁶
- High probability to be abused for international crime and terrorism.
- No law enforcement agencies have information on how exactly Small Arms are controlled.¹⁷
- It may be transferred to wrong end user¹⁸
- The biggest problem is the lack of international norms that directly regulate FAs and are operated in a "grey zone" where even the minimum safety standards are not applied.


16) Ioannis Chapsos & Paul Holtom , *op. cit*, p. 221.

17) Ioannis Chapsos & Paul Holtom , *op. cit*, p. 227.

18) KIM, Jayoung, *op. cit*, p. 84.

What happens when hijacked?

- No clear protocol or operation procedure given.
- Vessel classification does not have criterion for FA, making FAs more vulnerable to such attacks.¹⁹
- For instance, a Ukrainian PCASP hijacked an FA for his belated payment.²⁰




¹⁹) IACS, *op. cit.*, p. 1-31.

²⁰) "Same armed guard who took Eagle Bulk crew hostage takes over another vessel." Retrieved October 24, 2020, from <https://splash247.com/same-armed-guard-who-took-eagle-bulk-crew-hostage-takes-over-another-vessel/>


Defining FA Vessel's New Type?

- There is no way authorities can identify FA.
- However, creating safety related code for FA would create another security problems since these codes, such as IMO code, can be browsed by anyone.



Creating Database for FAs

- We suggest creating database of FA which covers all FAs.
- Related authorities can access this database by cooperating with IMO
- This system can prevent security threat and promote further discussion about FA vessel and its security threat.



Revising MSC.1/Circ.1334

- Under the provision 11 of MSC.1/Circ.1334, Ships are recommended to report actual or attempted attacks of piracy.
- New reporting system for FA vessel.
- With our new system, authority can verify if the vessel is FA.

Recommended practices

10 The recommended practices outlined below are based on reports of incidents, advice published by commercial organizations and measures developed to enhance ship security. The extent to which the recommendations are followed or applied are matters solely for the owners or masters of ships operating in areas where attacks occur. The shipping industry would also benefit from consulting other existing recommendations, including those given by the ReCAAP ISC³, the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre, BIMCO, ICS and other industry bodies.

11 Given that the masters are often required to follow multiple reporting procedures in these difficult circumstances, it is necessary to simplify these procedures as far as operationally feasible. It is therefore recommended that in the event of an occurrence masters should report all actual or attempted attacks of piracy and armed robbery or threats thereof, to:

- (i) the nearest RCC or regional piracy focal point where applicable (e.g., ReCAAP ISC in the Asian region⁴),
- (ii) the flag State, and
- (iii) the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre⁵.

Conclusion

- It is certain that FA is posing security threat on international maritime trade.
- We suggest system that can prevent these threat, however we did not neglect IMO's strategic directions.
- Therefore, we believe this would be a milestone for maritime security



Reference

- IMO Piracy Annual Report 2019
 - Shin, Seung-Gyoon, The Legal Status of Maritime Armed Security Guards both Domestically and Abroad, Problems of using Guns and Improvement Plan of Management, 2017
 - US army regulation 710-3 inventory management asset and transaction reporting system. Belligerent Reprisals and the 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949
 - Considering anti-piracy ship security: Citadel design and use
 - KIM, Jayoung, A study on the Legal Issues and Challenges Related to Floating Armories
 - Alexis Wilpon, Floating Armories: A Legal Grey Area in Arms Trade and The Law of The Sea
 - ANNEX : Summary of Laws Regulating Floating Armories and their Operations
 - United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Review of Maritime Transport 2015(New York and Geneva, 2015)
 - UNODC, Summary of Laws Floating Armories and Their Operations (Vienna: United Nations, 2020),
-



Thank you for your attention!

해(海)결사 / Troubleshooter

아이콘 저작자 표시

- 아이콘 제작자 Freepik from www.flaticon.com
 - 아이콘 제작자 Icongeek26 from www.flaticon.com
 - 아이콘 제작자 Freepik from www.flaticon.com
 - 아이콘 제작자 Freepik from www.flaticon.com
-

